With the popularity of cloud computing, cloud outsourcing has aroused great concern in academia. A lot of graph data are outsourced to the cloud for saving cost. As the cloud server may be not entirely reliable, the outsourced graph data are usually encrypted before sending to the cloud for the security considerations. Adjacency search is a basic operation, and many other operations can be performed based on the adjacency search. Adjacency search supporting synonym query is a more meaningful operation which can make a query user improve the scope of the query. Due to the graph data being encrypted in the cloud, adjacency search supporting synonym query becomes a very challenging task. In this paper, we propose an efficient solution to perform privacy-assured adjacency search supporting synonym query on the encrypted graph in the cloud (PASQ). Our work utilizes a stemming algorithm and an encryption mechanism to perform adjacency search. A query user can get a wider range of search results by this solution, and the privacy of query will not be disclosed. We present a design scheme for the outsourced graph and analyze the security. We demonstrate the efficiency of our scheme by the experiment results on a real graph data.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the blossom of cloud computing [1] , [2] , data outsourcing has become a popular trend. The application for a graph is pretty common, such as social network graph [3] , collaboration network [4] , and molecular graph [5] . Considering the benefits of data outsourcing in cloud computing, lots of graph data are outsourced to the cloud. The cloud may be not entirely reliable and be usually willing to learn the contents of graph data and the user information. In this case, the privacy becomes a matter of big concern [6], [7] . Before the graph data are sent to the cloud for preventing the privacy leak, these data are usually encrypted. However, the encrypted graph data can bring users great inconvenience, and it is not easy to process graph data. Therefore, achieving the adjacency The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Moayad Aloqaily. search supporting synonym query on encrypted graph is a very meaningful operation.
As a basic operation, adjacency search is an attempt to search for all adjacent vertices of a query vertex, and many other operations such as subgraph mining [8] , pattern matching [9] , community finding [10] , and graph outlier detection [11] , can be built based on the adjacency search. The adjacency search supporting synonym query is a more meaningful operation and takes the synonym of the query vertex as new query token, and then performs the adjacency search. Thus, a search user can get a broader query results set after the search. To achieve this search, we use the porter stemming algorithm in information retrieval [12] . For instance, in a collaboration network graph, a vertex represents a researcher, and each edge represents the partnership between two vertices. The n vertices of the collaboration network are represented with {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n }. The n vertices are firstly processed through a stemming algorithm, and the transformed stems {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s r } (r ≤ n) are gotten. The extracted stem has a similar meaning with the graph vertex and could represent a broader meaning. The work then is to take the stems {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s r } as query tokens to perform adjacency search. However, it is a challenging thing to conduct the adjacency search on encrypted graph. Considering ''pay-foruse'' billing rule for encrypted graph data stored in the cloud, it is not economical to download all the graph data which are decrypted on the local machine. As a result it's very useful to perform the adjacency search supporting synonym query over encrypted graph data. But it is also a sufficiently challenging task on account of security concerns in the cloud.
To execute searches on encrypted graph in the cloud, searchable encryption [13] - [17] is a quite useful way that allows cloud server securely perform query through encrypted tokens. In recent years searchable encryption is a key research direction, and there have been a lot of literatures [18] - [22] in this field. The solutions to the problem of searchable encryption supporting for dynamic deletion and addition were proposed in the literatures [18] - [20] . But all the ways and means could not be used directly to carry out the adjacency search supporting synonym query on encrypted graph. In recent years, a lot of studies of graph queries have already appeared in the literatures [23] - [27] . The idea of structured encryption and the usage of controlled disclosure were proposed by Chase et al. in the literature [23] . Many researchers studied the problem of privacy-preserving subgraph query in the literatures [24] - [26] . Yin et al. studied the problem of privacy preserving reachability query in the literature [27] . However, the problem of adjacency search supporting synonym query on encrypted graph has not been solved in all the schemes.
We solve the problem by proposing an efficient solution to perform privacy-assured adjacency search supporting synonym query on encrypted graph in the cloud (PASQ). By building an index, the PASQ scheme could accomplish adjacency search supporting synonym query and insure the query security. All the graph vertices are firstly transformed into new tokens by means of a stemming algorithm to meet the needs of synonym query. Then we encrypt the new words, and get encrypted tokens. All the encrypted tokens are used to build an index, and the index is stored in the cloud. When searching, a user could send an encrypted query token to the cloud server which performs search operations through the index and the query token. After the searching, the cloud server returns the encrypted query results to the user, and cannot learn the contents of the search results and the query token. From the security analysis and the experiment results, we declare that PASQ scheme is provably secure and efficient.
The contributions of this study are introduced as follows.
(1) We present a designing scheme to solve the problem of adjacency search supporting synonym query on encrypted graph.
(2) The security analysis of our scheme is proposed to preserve the security of search results.
(3) The experiment results show the efficiency of our proposed scheme.
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section II analyzes the related work. Section III gives the preliminaries of this paper. Section IV designs and describes our PASQ scheme. Sections V and VI evaluate PASQ scheme both from the security analysis and the experiments. Finally, Section VII sums up this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The management and use of outsourced data are often common in cloud computing, fog computing and edge computing environments [25] , [28] , [29] . In either case, our encrypted query policy on the remote server is consistent. Thus without loss of generality, we consider and state the cloud outsourcing scenario in this paper. Searchable encryption has great value in cloud outsourcing, and allows a user to outsource a large number of data to the cloud. The data are stored in a private way, and the secure search can be accomplished over them. Usually two encryption methods are used in outsourcing search, and the two methods are symmetric searchable encryption (SSE) and asymmetrical searchable encryption (ASE) [16] , [17] . As a rule, symmetric encryption is more efficient than asymmetrical encryption in terms of processing speed, thus symmetric encryption mechanism is adopted in our design ideas.
Searchable symmetric encryption [13] - [17] has been extensively studied as a cryptographic primitive and is very useful in cloud outsourcing query. The notion of searchable symmetric encryption was first presented in the literature [13] which took advantage of the stream cipher to encrypt all the words in each file. Using of a bloom filter, Goh [14] first introduced the notion of the secure index to solve encryption searching problem. Curtmola et al. proposed non-adaptive SSE and adaptive SSE two schemes, and made the searchable encryption extend to the case of multi-user settings [16] . A definition based on simulation was proposed in the literature [17] , and it aimed to insure the privacy of the index and encrypted query word.
Some extended searchable encryption methods then appeared in the literatures [18] - [22] . Kamara et al. proposed the SSE construction to support addition and deletion of files [18] . A dynamic SSE scheme was designed and implemented by Cash et al. in very-large databases [19] . A searchable encryption scheme was proposed to securely and efficiently update in the literature [20] . Cash et al. proposed a highlyscalable SSE scheme which supported boolean searches [21] . A semantic query scheme based on the concept hierarchy and the semantic relationship between concepts in the encrypted datasets were proposed in the literature [22] . But all the searchable encryption solutions can not adopted to perform the adjacency search supporting synonym query.
Recently some studies about secure graph queries have appeared [23] - [27] , [30] . Chase et al. introduced the idea of structured encryption and the application of controlled disclosure [23] , which studied the encryption scheme of graph data and proposed several query methods. The problem of secure search on encrypted graph in the cloud was defined and solved [24] , and subgraph search was implemented by using the ''filtering-and-verification'' principle. Based on the privacy homomorphism and obscuration methods, the problem of secure substructure similarity search over encrypted graph was solved in the literature [25] . Fan et al. studied and solved the problem of the authentication of subgraph search on outsourced graph [26] . The privacy preserving reachability query over the outsourcing graph data was researched in the literatures [27] , [30] . However, all the studies have not achieved adjacency search supporting synonym query on encrypted graph.
In the paper, we come up with a solution based on a stemming algorithm and the searchable encryption to execute adjacency search supporting synonym query and formally analyze the query security. The vertices of outsourced graph are converted into new tokens through the stemming algorithm, and next we construct an index. And then the search operations are accomplished by the index in the cloud. With the help of our proposed solution, the adjacency search on encrypted graph could be securely achieved.
III. NOTATIONS AND FORMULAS
Goldwasser and Micali firstly introduced the notion of semantic security, and proposed the concept of indistinguishability [31] . A system is semantically secure if whatever an adversary can compute about the plaintext given the ciphertext, he can also compute without the ciphertext [31] . In our scheme, we use a set (Kge, Enc, Dec) to represent a semantically secure symmetric encryption mechanism which consists of three polynomial-time algorithms [32] . Kge represents a key generating algorithm. Enc and Dec respectively denote an encryption algorithm and a decryption algorithm.
In our paper, k ← T represents the element k chosen from the set T , and k R ← − T denotes that the element k is chosen uniformly and randomly from the set T . We use to denote string concatenation [16] , [32] . The notations used are as follows in Table 1 . By using the porter stemming algorithm from information retrieval [12] , [33] , we solve the problem of synonym query. Any other stemming algorithm can be adopted to achieve synonym query in our scheme. In our search scheme, a user can search the adjacency vertices of given query vertex, and the scheme can support synonym query. In the searching, the query user can get a search results set of query vertex.
Given a graph G, and the vertex set is V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n }. We transform the elements of the set V by the porter stemming algorithm, and the transformed set is S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s r }, where r ≤ n. The stem extracting process is shown in Fig. 1 . The transformed set of the element s i in the set S is represented as V (s i ) ⊂ V . Because of the uniqueness of each word's root, any two subsets of V cannot have the same elements [33] , that is,
In this paper, we use D(s i ) to represent a set that contains all the adjacency vertices of the element s i . Then in D(s i ), it contains at least one adjacency vertex of a vertex in the set V [33] , that is,
IV. PASQ SCHEME CONSTRUCTION A. SCHEME OVERVIEW
In the cloud, the query architecture on encryption graph is shown in Fig. 2 . The architecture consists of data owner, cloud server and data users. To ensure the security of graph data and effectively execute adjacency search, we build a secure index for query. After the index is built, it is outsourced to the cloud server. The cloud server manages the stored graph data and performs adjacency search through the secure index according to the user's request. Due to the incomplete dependability of the cloud server, the user's request needs to be processed to generate encrypted query tokens, and it prevents the cloud server from stealing private information. The main work of this paper is to study the secure adjacency search supporting synonym query on encrypted graph, and with regard to the user's search authentication and query control, we adopt the existing methods, for example, broadcast encryption [16] , [17] .
Our PASQ scheme can perform adjacency search supporting synonym query on encrypted graph in the cloud, and the following goals should be achieved.
(1) Adjacency search implementation. A user can correctly get all the adjacency vertices by the encrypted query tokens.
(2) Search security. In the search, the search results and query tokens are not disclosed to the cloud.
(3) Efficiency. In the search process, as little as possible computation and storage cost is spent.
When designing our PASQ scheme, some data structures such as linked list, index, and query table are used. For each vertex of the graph, the data owner constructs the linked list to store its adjacency vertices. As the linked list contains the adjacency information between vertices of the graph, the contents of the linked list node need to be encrypted. When searching, the query vertex is processed and we get an encrypted query token. The query token is sent to the cloud server which executes secure queries and the search results are returned to the user.
To implement the secure search in our paper, we do this in three steps. Firstly, we transform all vertices into stem tokens with similar meanings through stem extraction process. Then we build adjacency linked list, and the list node contains the relationships between vertices. Secondly, we need to build an index, and the linked list nodes are randomly stored in the index. Finally, a query token is built according to a query request. The user sends the query token to the cloud, and the cloud server completes search process through the index and the query token.
In keeping with the majority of SSE schemes [16] , [17] , [22] , we suppose that the cloud server can adopt the adaptive attack model. Meanwhile, each search user has the mutual request authentication and search control mechanisms e.g., broadcast encryption [16] , [18] with the data owner.
B. SCHEME DESIGNING
In the scheme, our main job is that how to construct the secure index and how to perform search in the cloud, and the used algorithms are as follows.
• KeyGen(1 k ): Generating symmetric keys. A secure parameter k is taken as input, and it outputs a symmetric key.
• Buildinglist(G, χ): Building a linked list of each vertex for storing adjacency vertices. The graph G and the symmetric keys set χ are taken as inputs, and the synonyms set S of graph vertices and the linked list L are generated.
• Buildingindex(S, L, χ, χ ): Building a secure index, and it takes the synonyms set S, the linked list L, keys set χ and keys set χ as inputs, and outputs the secure index I .
• BuildingQueryToken(s i , χ): Building encrypted search tokens, and it takes a synonym s i and the keys set χ as inputs, and outputs encrypted search tokens set T s i .
• Searching(I , T s i ): Performing adjacency vertices search on the cloud server, and it takes secure index I and search tokens set T s i as inputs, and outputs adjacency vertices information set.
Let k be security parameter that can be used in the search scheme. As previously mentioned, we adopt (Kge, Enc, Dec) as symmetric encryption mechanism. The building process of our search scheme is as follows.
1) BUILDING ADJACENCY LINKED LIST
In order to accomplish the synonym query, we use the porter stemming algorithm, and the vertex set V is transformed into a set of synonyms with similar meanings by the stem extracting process. The transformed set is expressed as S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s r }, where r ≤ n. Two symmetric keys sets are generated by key generation algorithm KeyGen, and the two sets are respectively indicated as χ = {κ 1 , κ 2 , . . . , κ r } and χ = {κ 1 , κ 2 , . . . , κ r }. The keys are managed by the data owner on the client side. For each element s i (1 ≤ i ≤ r) in the set S, the data owner builds its adjacency linked list L i by the Algorithm 1, and each node of L i stores adjacency vertex information (using vervalue to represent). To prevent disclosure of private contents, we encrypt the linked list elements. The generated adjacency linked list set of all graph vertices is expressed as L = {L 1 , L 2 , . . . L r }.
Algorithm 1 Buildinglist

Input:
The graph G and the keys set χ Output:
adjacency linked list set L
The keys set is χ = {κ 1 , κ 2 , . . . , κ r }; 2: For i ← 1 to n do The element v i of the set V is performed synonym conversion, and the set S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s r } denotes the conversion results; And |s i | (1 ≤ i ≤ r) denotes the number of adjacency vertices about s i ;
2) BUILDING SECURE INDEX
After the adjacency linked list is generated, we build a secure index I to perform searching in the cloud. The index building process is designed as follows in Algorithm 2. For each vertex v i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) in the graph G, its synonym is s j (1 ≤ j ≤ r) through stem extracting, and all of the adjacency vertex information is stored in the linked list L j . The number of the adjacency vertex information of s j is represented as |L j |. For 1 ≤ t ≤ r, we build a symbol about adjacency information by s j and t, and the symbol is expressed as s j t.
All the adjacency symbols about s j are expressed as a set N s j = {s j 1, . . . , s j |L j |}. The associated adjacency contents of each element in the set N s j are stored in the index I . When searching adjacency vertex information of s j , this means searching for the elements in the index I about all the symbols in the set N s j . Each symbol in the set N s j corresponds to one element in the index I . To conceal the number of different adjacency vertices for each graph vertex, we need to add elements in the index, so that the number of adjacency vertices of each vertex is the same. The maximum degree of the graph is mg. The number of adjacency vertices of the synonym s j (1 ≤ j ≤ r) is |L j |, and the maximum value of which is expressed as ms. We use m to represent the maximum value of mg and ms. If |L j | < m, we need to add m − |L j | padding values.
In the building of adjacency linked list algorithm Buildinglist, for each adjacency linked list L i (1 ≤ i ≤ r) , we need to calculate s ij (1 ≤ j ≤ |L i |), the time complexity of building linked list L i is O(max(|L i |, m) = O(m). Therefore, the time complexity of building r adjacency linked list is O(r · m).
In the building of index algorithm Buildingindex, for each L i [j](1 ≤ j ≤ |L i |) in the adjacency linked list L i (1 ≤ i ≤ r), we need to calculate the place for storage lz in the index, and we need to assign and calculate for index I [lz]. Therefore, the time complexity of building index is O(r · m).
Algorithm 2 Buildingindex
Input:
S, L, keys set χ and keys set χ Output:
Index I 1:
The key set is χ = {κ 1 , κ 2 , . . . , κ r } and χ = {κ 1 , κ 2 , . . . , κ r };
3) PERFORMING SEARCH
After we have dealt with each adjacency linked list and the index, the index is sent to the cloud. When performing searching, we need to build search token T s i = (ϑ i1 , . . . , ϑ im ) of the query variable s i . We need an encryption algorithm to generate the search token, that is T s i = (ϑ i1 , . . . , ϑ im ) = (Enc κ i (s i 1), . . . , Enc κ i (s j m)). When a user wants to search all the adjacency information of a query variable, the search token of the query variable is sent to the cloud. By virtue of the index, the cloud server executes the search through Algorithm 3.
In the query algorithm Searching, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, if I [ϑ ij ] exists, we add I [ϑ ij ] to the search results set. If the search results set is empty, there is no query contents to match the query token. Therefore, the time complexity of searching algorithm is O(m).
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We conduct security analysis for our PASQ scheme in the section. Some notions used in our scheme are introduced in the following [16] .
• History: An interaction between the cloud server and a query user, including the graph G and the search tokens, denoted as H q = (G, T 1 , . . . , T q ). The partial history is denoted as 
• Access Pattern: An access pattern is the tuple R(
is the search results matching the search token T i .
• Search Pattern: A search pattern is a binary symmetric matrix q , such that q [i, j] = 1 if s i = s j , and q [i, j] = 0 otherwise, for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ q.
where |G E | is the total size of the encrypted graph data set G E , R(H q ) and q are access pattern and search pattern respectively. The trace of partial history is denoted as T r (H t q ) = (|G E |, R(H t q ), t ), where t ≤ q. During the searching, the cloud server cannot get information about the outsourced graph and the query user. In our paper, we prove the adjacency search scheme satisfies the adaptive semantic security. In the adaptive attack model, the cloud server can select the query request by the search tokens and query outcomes of previous retrievals [16] , [17] . To achieve the security, we adopt the security mode used in the existing schemes [16] , [17] . In terms of the security of our scheme, the cloud server cannot learn the additional contents beyond the trace, and thus our PASQ scheme is secure. The security theorem for our adjacency search scheme is stated below.
Theorem 1: Our adjacency search supporting synonym query meets the adaptive semantic security.
Proof. In order to prove the security, we describe a polynomial size simulator. For each q ∈ N , the simulator could produce a view (V t q ) * such that (V t q ) * is indistinguishable from the adversary's V t K (H q ), where K is a key, and 0 ≤ t ≤ q.
For t = 0, the simulator builds an index I * = {I * 1 , . . . , I * r } on the trace T r (H 0 q ) of partial history, where I * i R ← − {0, 1} |I i | for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Meanwhile, the simulator constructs simulative encrypted graph G * E R ← − {0, 1} |G E | by random generation. A copy of I * is kept to simulate future partial views for 1 ≤ t ≤ r. It is obvious that I * is indistinguishable from I , and the encrypted graph G * E is indistinguishable from the graph G E . Otherwise, the outputs of a symmetric encryption algorithm and the random strings of the same size are distinguishable. Thus, (V 0 q ) * is indistinguishable from V 0 K (H q ). For 1 ≤ t ≤ q, T r (H t q ) includes the search pattern matrix t for t queries, and the simulator will build the query tokens (T * 1 , . . . , T * t ) included in (V t q ) * . When building the search tokens, the tokens (T * 1 , . . . , T * t−1 ) that were included in (V t−1 q ) * would be reused, and we make the assumption that the simulator remembers (V t−1 q ) * . Alternatively, the simulator could reconstruct these query tokens from T r (H t−1 q ). To build T * t , for any 1 ≤ j ≤ t − 1, the simulator first
can't include s t , the simulator makes use of the contents R(s t ||m) ). The simulator randomly selects an address add i from I * for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. It is to make sure that all add i are pairwise distinct, and the next step is to build the search information T * t = (add 1 , . . . , add m ). The simulator remembers the relationship between T * t and s t . Otherwise, if H t−1 q includes s t , then the simulator retrieves the search information associated with s t and allots it to T * t . It will ensure that if H t q includes repeated query tokens, then the query information which is contained in (V t q ) * is the same. It is easy to see that the search information (T * 1 , . . . ,
Otherwise, the outputs of a symmetric encryption algorithm and the random strings of the same size are distinguishable. Therefore, for all 0 ≤ t ≤ q, there is no polynomial size adversary could distinguish between (V t q ) * and V t K (H q ). Thus, our proposed theorem have proven.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATIONS
We conduct the experimental evaluations for the proposed scheme on the Enron email network graph [34] , [35] in this section. We implement the experiment by C programming language over both local working computer and cloud server. The operating system of the local computer is Windows 7, and the computer uses Intel Core 2 CPU running at 2.6 GHz. The cloud server uses Linux operating system and has 4 CPU cores (2 × 2.8 GHz) and 8GB of RAM. The index building and the query results decryption are done on the local working computer, and the performance evaluation of query operation is accomplished on the cloud server.
Five graph data sets are used in the experiment, and generally speaking, the more edges, there are more adjacency vertices for a graph with the same number of vertices. For a graph with the same number of vertices, the different number of edges will to some extent affect the experimental results. Therefore, we analyze the proposed PASQ scheme, and consider two cases about the experimental graph data that is randomly selected in our scheme. One case is that the graph contains more edges (shorthand for PASQ_ME), and the number of edges in the five experimental graph data sets is respectively 3607, 7328, 15046, 34749 and 69231. The other contains less edges (shorthand for PASQ_LE) which has about half of the number of the former's edges. The comparisons of the two cases in the paper aim to evaluate the time and storage overheads of our scheme on encrypted graph query and verify the validity of the scheme. In our experimental evaluation, we do not take into consideration network latency and transmission overheads.
A. SECURE INDEX BUILDING
To prevent the cloud server from knowing the graph data and user's privacy in the query, we build an index and encrypted query tokens to implement secure queries. In the PASQ scheme, we first generate an adjacency linked list for each graph vertex by Buildinglist algorithm, and execute Buildingindex algorithm to build the secure index. Through the comparison of the two cases of graph data set, the experimental results of index construction are given. The results of index building time are plotted in Fig. 3 , where the Y -axis shows the index building time, and the X -axis represents the number of vertices in the graph.
As the number of vertices increases, the number of edges and adjacency vertices increases. So the index building time varies linearly with the number of vertices increasing. Usually, if a graph contains more edges, there are more adjacency edges in the graph. Therefore, the index building time of PASQ_LE is less than that of PASQ_ME. After the index is built, it is stored on the cloud server. The results of index building size are given in the Fig. 4 . The ordinate of the Fig. 4 represents the size of the index, and the abscissa represents the number of vertices in the graph. With the increasing of the graph vertices, the size of index building increases approximately linearly. And in the case of the same number of vertices, the more edges the graph has, the larger the index building size will be. The storage overhead of PASQ_LE is less than that of PASQ_ME. The change of maximum degree in a graph also has a great impact on the index building time and index size. And it can show in the increase and change of the slope of the curve in our experimental figures. 
B. PERFORMING SEARCH
In query operations, the cloud server executes search through the secure index. Fig. 5 gives the query performance results, where the Y -axis represents query time, and the X -axis represents the number of vertices. As can be seen in Fig. 5 , the query time is approximately linear to the number of vertices in the graph, and the query of PASQ_ME need more time than that of PASQ_LE. It shows that the query of our scheme would takes more time with the number of edges increasing when the number of vertices of the graph is the same.
After the cloud server performs the query operation, the user decrypts the returned query results. Experimental results of decryption operation are shown in Fig. 6 . The ordinate axis represents the time to decrypt the search results, and the abscissa axis represents the number of vertices in the graph. The decryption time of the query results is related to the decryption algorithm and the size of the query results. The decryption algorithms of PASQ_ME and PASQ_LE are the same in our scheme. The number of query results is the same with the maximum value of the number of adjacency vertices, and thus the decryption time is closely related to the maximum value. The decryption time of query results about PASQ_ME and PASQ_LE increases with the increase of graph vertices and changes approximately linearly. As the maximum value of the number of adjacency vertices of PASQ_LE is smaller than that of PASQ_ME, the decryption time of PASQ_LE is less than that of PASQ_ME.
In short, from the experimental data, the time and storage overhead of the query scheme building varies approximately linearly with the number of vertices in the graph. According to the experimental comparison results, the total cost of the experiment is acceptable and our proposed scheme accomplishes adjacency search supporting synonym query. Moreover, the building of the secure index is a one-time cost, and is done offline on the local machine. The cloud server cannot know the contents of index and query tokens, nor know the contents of query results. Therefore, our scheme implements secure adjacency queries and meets availability and efficiency.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a new adjacency search scheme based on the searchable encryption and a stemming algorithm. Firstly, we present the building process of the design scheme, which includes three main parts, namely building linked list, building secure index, and performing search. Secondly, we give the security analysis for our proposed scheme, and prove the security of our method. Finally, we perform the performance analysis through experiments, and the experiment results indicate that our scheme has better performance.
